This paper tries to assess the role of credibility in the implementation of inflation targeting framework in Indonesia. It illustrates how credibility may play an important role in the evolution of the Indonesian monetary policy. Understanding the degree of credibility would beneficial for Bank Indonesia (BI) to understand how to adjust policy instrument to achieve a long-term inflation target. Scaled from zero (purely not credible) to one (perfect credibility), our quantitative measurements found that credibility index for Indonesian monetary policy converge to around 0.5. Refer to projection and simulation results in this paper, the study shows expectation inflation of economic agents is strongly influenced by monetary policy credibility. The more credible the monetary policy, the faster inflation expectation would anchor to its target. In addition, high credibility also increase the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission since the disinflation cost represented by sacrifice ratio is lower. Under imperfect credibility the central bank prefer to attain its inflation target gradually, and if the credibility stock is doubled, then achieving its longterm inflation target required a lot shorter time (approximately 0.4 periods than the baseline).
I. INTRODUCTION
Law No.23 of 1999 mandates a single objective to Bank Indonesia (BI) to achieve and to maintain the stability of Rupiah. Inflation Targeting Framework (ITF) is currently BI»s monetary policy framework. ITF is characterized by setting an inflation target, announcing to public, and pursue its target as the primary goal of monetary policy. Numerically, low and stable long-term inflation is commonly referred to 3% in order to be competitive with other countries.
ITF could reflect as the framework of forward looking monetary policy, focused on inflation, and inflation expectations of economic agents. Important features of the ITF are commitment to pursue inflation as a primary goal of monetary policy, announcement of inflation target (including monetary policy measures), and accountability (Mishkin, 2000) . The framework provides a nominal anchor for the economic agents in forming their inflation expectations and predicting monetary policy.
The most important point in which monetary policy could affect inflation is that when the economic agents anchor their inflation expectations to the central bank»s target. If economic agents» expectations remain high, the disinflation process would last longer and require greater cost in the form of output loss (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999) . A central bank who can manage inflation expectations will gain an effective monetary policy, hence a credible monetary policy (Blinder, 1999) .
Several studies indicate that monetary policy credibility problem may arise because of the uncertainty of economic agents about the preferences of monetary authorities. Although the monetary authorities announce the target of inflation, it may not credible when the preferences of central banks to reduce inflation is weak (Geraats, 2001; Kozicki and Tinsley, 2003) . Economic agents try to interpret preferences based on the monetary authorities of monetary policy actions and performance of inflation and further renew their expectations. King (1996) stressed that transparency would encourage the learning process so that the inflation expectations of economic agents would anchor to the inflation target more quickly.
There are some significant attention associated with disinflation strategy in achieving low and stable inflation, namely: (i) the cost of disinflation related to the trade off of outputinflation (output loss), and (ii) the length of disinflation. Numerous studies show that the disinflation strategy is highly influenced by the credibility of monetary policy. If monetary policy is not fully credible (imperfect credibility), the learning process of economic agents is very slow. This in turn, will affect the formation of inflation expectations and the actual inflation will converge slowly to the target. Consequently, it would dampen on policy rates and other macro variables (GDP, exchange rate, etc).
In order to answer several questions related to the impact of monetary policy credibility on the dynamics of main macroeconomic variables, particularly in achieving the inflation target, the study aimed to develop a model namely ARIMBI (Aggregate Rational Inflation -Targeting Model for Bank Indonesia), which is equipped with credibility features. Specifically, the research objectives are (i) measuring the degree of credibility of monetary policy in Indonesia; (ii) studying the dynamics of the credibility of monetary policy in Indonesia and its impact on the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables (inflation, GDP, exchange rates, interest policy rates), and (iii) conducting simulations to obtain how big the cost of disinflation and how fast the process of disinflation to inflation target over medium term and long term in Indonesia with knowledge of the degree of credibility of monetary policy.
The next session of this paper explains the background of development models and the credibility of monetary policy. Methodology and the model, which describes model structure and transmission mechanism with imperfect credibility and equations in the model will be presented on session 3, while session 4 presents results of simulations and projections.
Conclusions and policy implications will close this paper. Blinder (1999) defines credibility as a ≈words matching deedsΔ. Compatibility between words and actions is what actually the core of the credibility became. A central bank is considered to be credible if they truly run their monetary policy to achieve the stated target. That definition is similar to Svensson (1999) who showed that a credible monetary policy is reflected in the close relationship between inflation targets with economic agent expectation.
II. THEORY

Central Bank Credibility
Given the nature of unobservable, the level of credibility is generally ranged from 0 (not credible) to 1 (perfectly credible). Valentin and Rozalia (2008) offer a method of measuring the credibility of monetary policy as follows:
(1)
With π e is an inflation expectation of the economic agents (private sector) and π tar is the central bank inflation target. For illustration, when the inflation expectations perfectly match the target ( π e = π tar ), then the index gained credibility will be 1 (or perfect credibility). Conversely, if inflation expectations are twice the inflation target or more, then the credibility index would be valued at 0 or (no credibility). It is worth to mention that, this approach imposes ≈symmetric punishmentΔ.
As an alternative measurement of the credibility of monetary policy, Cecchetti and Krause (2002) formulates as follows:
With π e is inflation expectations of economic agents (private sector) and Π target is the central bank»s inflation target. Referring to the formula above, when inflation expectations equal or exceed the upper bound of 20%, then the credibility index would be 0 (not credible). Unlike previous measures, Cecchetti and Krause (2002) does not impose symmetric punishment and anywhere the inflation expectations are lower than the target, then the monetary authority is considered to be perfectly credible.
Within the framework of this ITF, credibility becomes crucial particularly for central banks in developing countries, which are not usually independent from the interests of the government or political establishment. This credibility could be built also through communication and transparency to the public. Through these efforts, the public trust to the central bank would increase and in turn inflation expectations in the community could anchor on inflation targets.
Achieving low and stable inflation is a prerequisite for good macroeconomic developments.
Central banks have substantial flexibility in conducting monetary policy (e.g. consider economic growth, stable exchange rate, the existing business cycle, boom, asset price), but their main responsible is attaining medium-long term inflation target. Thus, the ITF framework is often described as ≈constrained discretionΔ (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997) . Constraint is manifested through high transparency and accountability of central banks, in order to build the credibility of monetary policies on disinflation process and to reduce time-inconsistency problem.
On this paper, we internalize the central bank credibility into the macroeconomic model.
In general, the structure of macroeconomic models is built to capture the real economy containing the interaction of various economic variables. Basically there are two main objectives of (2) macroeconomic modeling, namely economic projections and policy impact analysis (policy simulation).
Refers to the practice of modeling done by the various central banks who hold the ITF, a reliable macroeconomic should : (i) be able to reflect the characteristics of economic structure and to produce a comprehensive analysis of the main determinants of inflation, (ii) represents the monetary policy transmission mechanism; (iii) be equipped with a policy rule, suppose the interest rate, Taylor rule, and put the inflation target and an explicit expectation formation mechanism therein, (iv) theoretically consistent, and (v) have a well-defines steady state and produce projections/ analysis that are consistent with theory.
The Model
In practice, there is usually a tradeoff between accuracy projection resulting from the econometric model and the medium-long term policy simulation obtained from the Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium DSGE model, the economic model used for policy simulation based on micro-economic foundations, with dynamic path and general equilibrium framework and with a stochastic shock. Projections generated from Econometric models and the direction The figure above shows that there are four primary behavioral equations in the model, namely the inflation equation New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), the output gap, uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) and the Taylor rule. Inflation is influenced by forward and backward looking inflation itself, the output gap, changes in oil prices and real exchange rate. Output gap is affected by the backward and forward looking variable itself, the real interest rate, real exchange rates and external demand (captured by the US GDP). Taylor Rule equation for determining the nominal policy interest rate is influenced by the real interest rate, deviations of inflation from target and output gap. While UIP, which is a deviation between the expectations of the exchange rate, interest rate differentials are influenced by both domestic and foreign (rest of the world).
One important assumption on the model, the attainment of inflation targets with minimum cost is strongly influenced by the credibility of monetary policy. There are two ways to capture the dynamics of the credibility of monetary policy in a model, either by letting this credibility variable to be exogenous or endogenous. By modeling credibility of monetary policy to be exogenous, we assumes that the credibility of monetary policy follow the auto regressive AR(1).
On the other hand, by modeling the credibility of monetary policy as endogenous, we assume that the credibility of monetary policy follows the nature of stock and will increase or decrees in accordance with the past performance of the central bank on achieving his target. In this case the greater the credibility of monetary policy the closer the inflation expectation to the target, hence the sooner the actual inflation anchored to the target.
The above model is represented on simultaneous equations. Technically, the rend variable is denoted by using alphabet letters with symbols line or bar on top, while the gap is denoted by using alphabet letters with symbols hat or cap on it. 
Main Equation
Equations (3) to (13) are main behavioral equations which describe transmission mechanism in the model. 
World Oil Price Equation
World oil price data is the price of oil that comes from Minas (USD / barrel). Incorporating world oil prices into model, we need a few steps. Assuming that US inflation from the world representing the real world oil price levels could be calculated with the equation: And the last is the equation of identity that reflects the relationship that comes from such a simple economic theory: equations (32) and (33) 
Identity Equation
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Where as previously described, the parameters cpiplus illustrates how much additional maximum inflation is added to the variable inflation expectations if the central bank has no credibility. For example, if the central bank has no credibility at all mean that the variable INCRED t valuable one and the value cpiplus 0.5, then the expectations of inflation worth 0.5% higher than inflation expectations that are Perfect Foresight.
In this paper, we modeled two types of credibility, namely exogenous and endogenous.
ARIMBI with exogenous credibility is modeled with a simple way is to model the variable INCRED t into the AR (1) toward the value of steady state is zero, or in other words assumed credibility would be increased from time to time to the credibility of management (full credible).
While for the model with endogenous credibility is modeled by adding the past performance of the attainment of inflation to its target into the equation above
In endogenous approach, we try to incorporate credibility which does not always increase from time to time, but depending on his past performance.
III. METHODOLOGY
There are eight variables, namely real GDP, CPI inflation, short-term interest rate, exchange rate, U.S. inflation, Fedfund rate, U.S. GDP and world oil prices (Minas). Before the filtering process to separate the variables and its gap and trend, firstly, observed variables are removed from its seasonal effects by employing X12 US Census Bureau. Filtering process generally uses the HP filter method with some adjustment to the level and trend growth in the variable. The data used is since 2000Q1 to 2009Q4. Indonesia does not use long historical data for several reasons, among them is that before 1997 Indonesia implemented fixed exchange rate regime and there is a significant jump in the data due to economic crisis in the late 90s period.
Behavioral parameters are a parameter that would determine the dynamics of the model towards long-term equilibrium or steady state. Behavioral parameters in ARIMBI model using parameter calibration approach based on parameters in other model BISMA constructed by Bank Indonesia and some other studies both from domestic and abroad that have similar characteristics with the Indonesian economy. The following baseline parameters used in ARIMBI: Index measurement credibility of Bank Indonesia would be proceeding in two approaches, Valentin and Rozalia (VR, 2008) and Cecchetti and Krause (CK, 2002) . Inflation target data is used for annual data 2002-2009 at both the target-setting by the BI as well as by the Government with input from the central bank. As for the inflation expectations used three data namely:
Business Survey (Survey SKDU BI), Consensus Forecast (CF) and Actual Inflation. Therefore, we would obtain six BI credibility indexes as the results. Previous research Disinflation strategy for achieving low and stable inflation: (i) the long disinflation of the time required to reach the target medium-and long-term inflation, and (ii) the cost of disinflation: Sacrifice Ratio, that is the output loss that occurred for each decline in inflation by 1%.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Inflation Behavior and Expectation in Indonesia
In the last two decades, Indonesian inflation is high as well as its volatility. By removing the crisis period, average inflation is around 8.5%. After eliminating the effect of structural shocks, inflation in Indonesia reached 7.9%. The core inflation tends to decline around 7.4%
after the implementation of the ITF (Table 3) , however, inflation in Indonesia is relatively higher than Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore or the Philippines, see Figure 1 . Some studies in Indonesia in recent years also demonstrate the importance of inflation expectations on inflation forming 5 . Therefore, inflation expectations must be considered in formulating monetary policy in order to achieve the inflation target. 
Figure 1. Comparison of Inflation in ASEAN Region
3 The inflation persistence was estimated by employing an autoregressive univariate model. By adopting the formula of Gujarati (2003) contained in the Alamsyah (2008) , the persistence of inflation from 0.8 to 0.9 means that if there is a surprise then 50% of those surprises would be absorbed within a period of 4-9 months and the rest would be absorbed as inflation trip back to the normal average length of term. Long computation time required to absorb 50% shocks using a formula calculating the mean lag ¡/ (1-¡), with ¡ is the degree of persistence. 4 Hutabarat (2005) also found that inflation expectations of economic agents in the period 1999-2004 was dominated on inflation formation than the output gap, administered prices, supply shocks, and exchange rates. 5 A study by Chatib Basri, Damayanti and Sutisna (2002) from LPEM -UI indicates that the major source of Indonesian inflation is expected inflation, followed by exchange rate depreciation, and money supply. Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan Jan
Besides the problems mentioned above, the high inflation in Indonesia is also sourced from external influence, including exchange rate pass through effect and world commodity prices. Additionally, the inevitable fact is that quite dominant of phenomenon shocks that spread through the follow-up expectations which in turn would core inflation. For example, inflationary pressures in 2005 and 2008 were originating from the external shocks coming from the increase in global commodity prices of both energy and food commodities. The increase in world oil prices has prompted the government to raise fuel prices by an average of up to 28.7%. In addition to providing a direct impact on inflation, the impact of this second round effect would also contributed to push the inflation rate. In general, in almost a decade, the deviation between actual inflation and target due to good fundamentals as well as nonfundamental shocks are closely associated with supply side management. Given the monetary policy tools are more suitable to solve the problem on the demand side, the supply side problems requires coordination between institutions including Bank Indonesia and the government and its related agencies.
With the above facts, the work brings to the decline in inflation (disinflation) is not an easy task. Characteristics of inflation that tend to persistent bring consequence the slow process of disinflation. One of the researches (Alamsyah, 2008) showed that persistence is caused primarily by the formation of inflation expectations which mostly in backward looking manner.
This occurs due to fairly large proportion of producers who do not adjust their price and maintain price to the previous On the other hand, forward-looking is seems indicated in spite of in very short term. This is partly visible from inflation expectations on Survey of Consumer for three months periods that have a high correlation with actual inflation at t +1 and t +2. Regression testing with the involvement of other macroeconomic variables also showed that inflation expectations three months on Survey of Consumer has explanatory power of ahead core inflation projection in 6 In the formation of inflation within the framework of NKPC equation (the New Keynesian Phillips Curve), it is assumed that the firm faces a monopolistic competition market structure so there are companies that could determine the price (price setting) because it has little monopoly power. However, most companies still keep its price by indexation to a price before (backward looking). With this assumption, we would get the hybrid NKPC, in which inflation expectations would be influenced by the backward looking and forward looking and the output gap (as a proxy of marginal cost).
very short term i.e. 2-3 months. This indicates that inflation expectations from surveys have been able to act as an indicator of inflationary pressure despite the very short term.
In general, though backward looking behavior is quite dominant in the inflation formation in Indonesia, this tends to decline in period after Asian Crisis (1997). Conversely, Alamsyah (2008) found that forward looking behavior tends to increase in the period after the crisis. As backward looking behavior is declining, degree of inflation persistence is seems declining. From groups of commodities perspective, the decline of inflation persistence mainly occurred in clothing goods and imported goods as the increasingly competitive market structure. Hence, decreasing the degree of inflation persistence would bolster the growing role of monetary policy to control inflation.
Inflation Persistence, Credibility Issue, and Disinflation Process
Inflation Persistence and Policy Credibility
The high persistence of inflation in the midst of current economic conditions facing pressure from both external and domestic causes of disinflation efforts towards low and stable inflation in the medium-long term have a very serious challenge. It should be noted also that the ability of central banks in controlling inflation is not on overall CPI inflation, but only limited to core inflation (core inflation) that are influenced mainly by fundamental factors, namely the output gap, exchange rates, particularly on prices of imported goods (imported inflation), and inflation expectations. Meanwhile, other components such as volatile food and administered prices as part of the CPI inflation rate are not a central bank domain. Thus, the rate of low and stable inflation could not be achieved solely through the monetary policy of Bank Indonesia, but also determined by fiscal and other economic policies pursued by the Government. In addition to reducing the exchange rate pass through effect into inflation, it is necessary to also support policies to keep exchange rate volatility is not too large.
As noted earlier, core inflation contributes to CPI inflation more dominant than volatile food and administered. In this case, core inflation is more influenced by inflation expectations that occurred in the community compared to the output gap and exchange rates. To that end, the inflation target and monetary policy measures and monetary instruments used to achieve it should be communicated effectively to public to influence and shape inflation expectations.
Hence, credibility of monetary policy is essential to achieve a central bank»s goal, namely low and stable inflation. Within ITF, if economic agents believed that monetary policy would be capable or credible in achieving its inflation target, the inflation expectations of economic agents would soon anchored to the inflation target so that actual inflation would also be anchored on the inflation target. This would further reduce inflation persistence. More credible monetary policy, adjustment process of economic agents on anchoring inflation expectations with the target would be quick, and vice versa. As a common indicator, deviation between inflation expectations and actual inflation towards the inflation target is employed to indicate the credibility 7 .
Due to high persistence of inflation, rapid process on disinflation would be very expensive as it requires tight interest rates that could cause a huge of output loss. Consequently, to achieve the objectives of monetary policy and minimizes the loss of social welfare then the monetary authority tends to make gradual disinflation. If the decline in actual inflation that occurred is not significant then inflation expectations of economic agents would adjust only marginally to the inflation target. Moreover, economic agent would rely on backward looking behavior which increases the persistence of inflation.
Observations on Indonesia economy shows that the credibility of monetary policy in Indonesia is relatively low, and it contributes to the persistence of high inflation ). However, in line with the implementation of the ITF, the credibility of monetary policy has improved. This is reflected by increasing of Kalman Gain 8 parameter from around 0.2 in the period before implementation of the ITF (July 2005) to approximately 0.4 in the period after ITF implementation. It may be argued that with the increased credibility of monetary policy after the ITF, inflation tends to be influenced by the behavior of forward looking economic agents.
As a consequence, declining inflation persistence would lead inflationary expectation to the target due to monetary authority 9 .
This is consistent with the observation of Orphanides and Williams (2007) . Their study indicates that the formation of inflation expectations experienced by pointing at the target inflation as the main target of monetary policy in the era of the ITF would facilitate the learning process of economic agents better than non-ITF era with multiple objectives. This process would cause inflation expectations of economic agents become more forward looking and anchored 7 Erceg and Levin (2003) showed that the low credibility of monetary policy of the US in 1980-1985 led to the persistence of high inflation and high cost (sacrifice ratio). An important implication of these findings is that the persistence of inflation is not an inherent characteristic of an economy but diversity associated with the credibility of monetary policy. It is shown that the persistence of inflation would be lower if monetary policy is credible, and otherwise create a high persistence of inflation when monetary policy is not fully credible (imperfect credibility) because economic agents have not fully believe in the inflation target in the future (forward looking). 8 Technically, the Kalman Gain parameter captures a projection by economic agencies on an inflation target of monetary authorities in the Taylor rule equation through the derivation of Kalman filter. Kalman gain parameter reflects the learning process of economic agents about the target inflation so that monetary authorities could be used as a measure of the degree of credibility of monetary policy. The faster of learning process by economic agents about the inflation target of monetary authorities then the higher degree of credibility of monetary policy. Kalman Gain value is between 0 and 1, where it is getting closer to a more credible monetary policy. 9 The behavior of economic agents that are more forward looking in inflation formation during the period of ITF implementation is in line with the findings due to Solikin (2004), Yanuarti (2007) , and Alamsyah (2008) .
to inflation target. The results are also consistent with Siregar and Goo (2008) which showed that inflation inertia in Indonesia has decreased for both non-tradable goods and tradable goods in the period of implementation of the ITF as compared to the period before implementation of the ITF. (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (1) - (3) (1) - (3) (1) - (3) (1) - (3) (1) - (3) (2) - (1) (2) - (1) (2) - (1) (2) - (1) (2) - (1) (2) - (3) (2) - (3) (2) - (3) (2) - (3) (2) - (3 Table 4 .
Monetary Policy Credibility and Disinflation Process
Theoretically, the ITF aims to achieve a low and stable inflation 10 . In this regard, although there has been no agreement on how much the inflation target, in the long term target level of inflation in developing and developed countries amounted to 2% -3% (Roger and Stone, 2005) . However, for developing countries, including Indonesia, inflation is quite far from this desired level of long-term inflation. Average inflation for developing countries when implementing the ITF is above 13% (double digit), which is higher than developed countries which amounted around 4% (Fraga et al., 2004 (Harmanta, 2009) 12 . In this case, the learning process to reduce the economic agent»s inflation target is slow. These causes the expectations of economic agents converge slowly and gradually to the target of inflation . In addition, the strategy of gradual disinflation in Indonesia is desirable 11 Some researchers showed that the strategy is strongly influenced by the credibility of disinflation policy central bank monetary. Developed countries are considered more credible monetary policy tends implementing an aggressive strategy of disinflation because monetary policy is able to guide inflation expectations of economic agents and actual inflation to its target quickly. Hence, interest rate response would be optimal and would not cause a large loss of output. While developing countries are considered less credible, the strategy of disinflation is likely to apply gradually as monetary policy has not been able to guide fully inflation expectations so that response rates could not optimal and may cause large loss of output. 12 As shown by Ball (1994) , disinflation could be done without sacrificial fee (costless) significantly during inflation expectations are rational pure inflation (purely rational expectation) and monetary policy is fully credible (perfect credibility). 13 In such a situation is not fully credible monetary policy so that inflation expectations principals actual inflation and slow economic convergence of the inflation target, the monetary authority considers that rapid disinflation would require a response of interest rates so large that they could disinflation raises the cost of very expensive form of output loss is very high. Consequently, to run a monetary policy that minimizes the loss of social welfare then the central bank pursuing a strategy of gradual disinflation. Observing economic agents dynamics of the monetary policy pursued by looking at actual inflation compared inflation target. By looking at the decline in inflation that is not too large to provide new information a little so that inflation expectations of economic agents would adjust only marginally against the central bank inflation target. 14 When monetary policy is not fully credible, the slow decline of in interest rates would possibly generate a larger output loss. Monetary policy that seems likely to tight would affect the behavior of economic agents in doing so thus consumption is slow down. Further more, it affects the production side then finally the output would not be increase. In overall, this mechanism is reflected in the Sacrifice Ratio.
considering that inflation level sometimes reached double digits, moderate degree of persistence, and the backward looking behavior of the agent. 
Initial Credibility Index
As already mentioned above, the index measuring the credibility of monetary policy is conducted using, VR2008 and CK 2002. Especially for the measurement of CK in 2002 made adjustments over the previous limit of very loose 20% to 15%. It is with consideration of Indonesia which is a developing country so that the business environment is relatively more uncertain compared to developed countries. Based on historical data of Indonesia, the highest CPI (yoy) in Indonesia are 17.11% in 2005 and has never reached 20%.
Using expectations data (Survey SKDU BI, Consensus Forecast and Actual Inflation), we obtain measurement results for BI Credibility Index BI as follows: Table 4 shows that the use of inflation expectations data and how different measurement 
Simulation Results of Exogenous Credibility
The simulation results and projections of macro variables with some degree of exogenous credibility are presented in the figure 5.
Based on the graph above shows that the baseline scenario with the assumption that monetary policy credibility of the initial value of 0.5 and considering the existence of inflationary pressures began Quarter-10 (Q-10) is approaching the upper limit of the inflation target in line with the global and domestic economic recovery, interest rates (the optimum Taylor rule based on the endogenous ARIMBI) needs to be raised start on Q-8 and then could be lowered gradually began Q-12. On one hand, the path of inflation is likely anchoring to 4.0% + 1% in Q-24. On the other hand, path of interest rates would provide economic growth about 5.5% to 6.4% in next few quarters before going to achieve economic growth around 7.0 -7.5% in Q-24. In line with the path of interest rate and the trajectory of inflation and GDP, exchange rates will slightly appreciate than start stay steadily on Rp. 9300-9750 / USD in medium and long term.
In the less credible scenario with the initial assumption of lower credibility value to 0.1, the path of inflation is higher than the baseline in which inflation in Q-9 to Q-12 would approach the upper limit of the target. Hence, inflation start in Q-13 would pass through the upper limit of the inflation target. Considering the existence of a higher inflation pressure compared to baseline, central bank should increase interest rates higher than the baseline to achieve mediumterm inflation target of 4% (plus minus 1%) in Q-24. Path to higher interest rates would lead to lower economic growth compared to the baseline to about 5.5% to 6.2 % in up to Q-12. In overall cost of disinflation, the scenario is less credible monetary policy would cause the Sacrifice Ratio (output loss that occurred for the decline in inflation of 1%) higher than baseline. In the medium term -long or less credible scenario also causes the trajectory is more weaken the exchange rate compared to baseline. 
Figure 5. Simulation Results of Exogenous Credibility
On the more credible scenario assuming higher initial credibility value to 0.9, the path of inflation is lower than the baseline in which inflation moved closer to the midpoint or lower limit of the inflation target. Consider the trajectory of inflation is lower than the baseline and has been anchored relative to the inflation target, the current interest rate of could be maintained until Q7, before it could be lowered gradually. Path to lower interest rates would lead to higher economic growth compared to the baseline to about 5 √ 6 % in next few quarters. From cost of disinflation perspective, the scenario of a more credible monetary policy would cause the Sacrifice Ratio (output loss that occurred for the decline in inflation of 1%) is lower than the baseline. In the medium -long more credible scenario would cause the trajectory which has further strengthened the exchange rate compared to baseline.
Simulation Results of Endogenous Credibility
In the baseline scenario with the initial assumption of 0.5 and consider the credibility of inflation pressure from Q-10 which approximates the upper limit of the inflation target, interest rates (optimum based on the Taylor rule in ARIMBI endogenous) needs to be raised gradually since Q-6 and then could be lowered gradually began Q-11. With this interest rate path, consequently, the path of inflation targets is likely to be achieved towards 4.0% in medium term. This interest rate path would also bolster the economic growth around 5.5% to 6.2% in next few quarters before going to achieve economic growth steadily around 7.0% -7.5%. In line with the path of interest rate and the trajectory of inflation and GDP, exchange rates would stronger (appreciation) around Rp. 9150-9550/ USD.
In the less credible scenario, the initial assumption of credibility is 0.1. Trajectory of inflation is higher than the baseline in which inflation in the year 2011 would approach the upper limit of the inflation target. Considering the existence of a higher inflation pressure compared to baseline, central bank should increase interest rates higher than the baseline to achieve the inflation target term medium for 4%. Indeed, path to higher interest rates would lead to lower economic growth compared to the baseline. In cost of disinflation perspective, less credible scenario would cause Sacrifice Ratio (output loss that occurred for the decline in inflation of 1%) higher than baseline. In the medium-long term, less credible scenario also causes the trajectory is more to weaken the exchange rate compared to baseline.
On the more credible scenario, we impose initial assumption for credibility is 0.9. Trajectory of inflation is lower than the baseline in which inflation and moved closer to the midpoint or lower limit of the inflation target. Considering the lower inflation trajectory than the baseline and has been anchored relative to the inflation target, the current interest rate could be maintained up to Q-7, before it could be lowered gradually. Obviously, path to lower interest rates would lead also to higher economic growth compared to the baseline (around 5.5 % to 6.5% in next few quarters). From cost of disinflation perspective, the more credible scenario would cause lower Sacrifice Ratio (output loss that occurred for the decline in inflation of 1%) than the baseline. In the medium-long term, the more credible scenario would cause strengthened the exchange rate compared to baseline. In the late scenario, with the assumption that monetary policy credibility of the initial value equal to the baseline of 0.5, delay in the hike of policy response rate would cause the trajectory of inflation is higher than the baseline. As we could see from Graph 4.3, inflation near the upper limit of the inflation target in up to next eight quarters and pass the upper limit of the inflation target start Q-9. In order achieving medium-term inflation target (4% in Q-24) and considering the inflation trajectory is higher than the baseline, interest rates need to be raised higher than the baseline before it could be reduced gradually since Q-16. These higher interest rates path would affect medium-term economic growth which is lower than the baseline.
In term of cost of disinflation, the late scenario would yield higher Sacrifice ratio (output loss that occurred for the decline in inflation of 1%) than the baseline, especially in the medium term. In the medium-long term, the slow response of monetary policy would lead to a better path to weaken the exchange rate compared to baseline.
Based on the simulation results above, this study shows that the delay in the response rate would cause higher inflation path and could even exceed the inflation target.
Consequently, bringing down inflation back to the target required very high interest rates.
Obviously, this in turn would impact on slowing economic growth. Trade off inflation and higher output has an impact on the increasing Sacrifice ratio thus for every effort to decrease inflation requires a higher output loss. Implications of these findings, Bank Indonesia need to maintain consistency in responding to inflation pressures in a timely manner with an optimum amount of interest. Hence, delay in response of monetary policy would affect the higher cost of disinflation.
Periods for Disinflation Process
Related to focus on the length of disinflation, simulation and projection length of disinflation towards medium-term target (4%) and long-term target (3%) are described in Table 5 . Table 5 shows that the length of disinflation to anchor to medium-term inflation target is strongly influenced by the degree of monetary policy credibility. The scenario with the initial baseline value of 0.5 monetary policy credibility, either exogenous or endogenous, takes less than 19 quarters to reach an inflation of 4% in medium term. If the initial value of credibility decreased to 0.1, then the process of disinflation to 4% as medium term target requires a longer period which is 25 quarters (exogenous) or 31 quarters (endogenous). Conversely, if the initial value increased to 0.9, then process of disinflation to medium term requires only a shorter time period, 11 quarters (exogenous) or 25 quarters (endogenous). Similarly, disinflation to 3% or 64 quarter (endogenous) to achieve 3% inflation. In baseline credibility index (0.5), it takes 40 quarters (exogenous) or 56 quarter (endogenous) to achieve long term inflation target, 3%.
If we compare endogenous and exogenous approach, it shows that exogenous monetary policy credibility on the one side would provide convenience, but the results less realistic. This is because exogenous credibility could not capture the rewards -punishments on the attainment of inflation targets as well. In contrast, modeling of endogenous monetary policy credibility on the one side would be more complex, but it provides more realism. It is argue that endogenous credibility possibly could catch the reward -punishment against inflation target better because the credibility of monetary policy are explicitly captured by the deviation of inflation to the inflation target. For example, the greater endogenous credibility of monetary policy, the smaller deviations of inflation from its target thus there are rewards that cause the length of disinflation to 3% would faster than exogenous approach. Conversely, smaller the endogenous credibility, higher deviations of inflation from its target then there are punishments that cause the length of disinflation to 3% would be slower than exogenous approach.
Based on projected results and simulation credibility of monetary policy as stated above, this study specifically shows that:
Inflation expectations of economic agents are strongly influenced by central bank monetary policy credibility. More credible monetary policy, faster inflation expectations anchored to the inflation target thus greater chance that actual inflation would be anchored to the target. This in turn would accelerate the disinflation process to low and stable inflation in medium√long term.
Disinflation cost is strongly influenced by central bank monetary policy credibility. The more credible monetary policy, the lower the cost of disinflation (reflected in the Sacrifice ratio) to achieve low and stable inflation and in the medium term -long. This in turn would minimize the trade off of output -inflation.
More controlled inflation at a low and stable level would provide conducive conditions for sustainable economic growth and controlled exchange rates volatility.
Slow response of monetary policy than optimum conditions (baseline) may cause higher inflation path. Hence, it would lead to longer on achieving the target, higher interest rates, and higher cost of disinflation.
V. CONCLUSIONS
ARIMBI with Imperfect Credibility is theoretically coherent and reasonable fit with the data to match the Indonesian economy after the implementation of the ITF, and has the ability to be used as a forecasting and policy simulation (FPAS).
The result of calculating the degree of credibility of monetary policy indicates that monetary policy in Indonesia has not fully credible (imperfect credibility) with a value of approximately 0.5 (from a scale of 0 to no credibility and scale of 1 to perfect credibility).
Projection and simulation results show that the disinflation to the target low and stable inflation in Indonesia was influenced by the credibility of monetary policy. The more credible monetary policy, the disinflation process towards the target low and stable inflation would be more quickly achieved. In addition, endogenous monetary policy credibility is more realistic than exogenous approach.
Projection and simulation results show that the costs of disinflation to the target low and stable inflation in Indonesia (the cost of disinflation), which is measured based on the Sacrifice Ratio, is strongly influenced by the credibility of monetary policy. The more credible monetary policy, the smaller the ratio of Sacrifice, which means every effort to decrease inflation, would cause not too large output loss. The implication is that central bank face a smaller trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing output.
The slow response of monetary policy than optimum conditions (baseline) would cause higher inflation path, so that it might lead to a longer achieving the target with higher interest rates and higher cost of disinflation.
In terms of strategies for achieving the target low and stable inflation in Indonesia, the results showed that the monetary policy conditions are not fully credible (imperfect credibility), and then the central bank tends to make the process of gradual disinflation. This is because if monetary policy is not fully credible, then the central bank»s efforts to quickly achieve low inflation in a short time would have implications on interest rate increases very high (too tight) so it would create very large fluctuations on output and exchange rate.
Research shows that inflation expectations greatly influenced by the credibility of monetary policy. The implication is that the management of inflation expectations is very important, although not easy, because it requires a credible monetary policy. This condition could be
constructed by continuing to demonstrate its commitment to inflation target consistently.
The Related to its limitations and further research opportunities, the dynamics of the credibility of monetary policy is modeled in a linear fashion. Looking ahead, non-linear credibility would be challenging as it may capture effects of punishment -reward in better and realistic way.
